By Oghenekevwe Kofi
The victory of the opposition in Hungary yesterday, like the Polish election in 2023, is a victory for democracy, not just in Europe but around the world.”
When Barack Obama posted those words on April 13, 2026, he was pointing to a political reality that is often underestimated. Opposition parties win elections all the time. But every so often, something more significant happens. Incumbents who appear firmly in control of power, institutions, and the political system itself are defeated at the ballot box.
These are not ordinary elections. They are political shocks. Moments when systems designed to sustain power still produce outcomes that defy expectations.
Such outcomes are rare. Systems built to favour incumbents are not easily overturned by votes alone. That is precisely why, when it happens, it resonates far beyond national borders.
One of the clearest examples remains Malaysia in 2018. For over six decades, the ruling coalition had shaped the political landscape to its advantage, from electoral boundaries to media influence. At the centre of this system was Najib Razak, whose administration was dogged by corruption allegations but still widely expected to retain power. Instead, a united opposition led by Mahathir Mohamad delivered an outcome few thought possible. It was not just a defeat. It was the dismantling of a political machine built to endure.
In Gambia, the story was even more dramatic. Yahya Jammeh had ruled for 22 years with near total control of state institutions. Elections under such conditions are often little more than formalities. Yet in 2016, he lost to Adama Barrow. The shock was immediate. Jammeh would later attempt to cling to power, forcing intervention by ECOWAS, but the significance of that moment remains. Even in a tightly controlled system, the electorate found a way to deliver a verdict.
A similar pattern emerged in Zambia in 2021. The administration of Edgar Lungu had been accused of restricting opposition activity and shrinking democratic space. Yet when the votes were counted, Hakainde Hichilema did not just win. He won by a margin too large to be manipulated. It was a reminder that when public sentiment reaches a tipping point, even a tilted system can be overwhelmed.
In Maldives, the odds looked even steeper. Abdulla Yameen had consolidated power across the judiciary and security apparatus, while key opposition figures faced imprisonment or exile. Yet in 2018, a united opposition rallied behind Ibrahim Mohamed Solih and secured an unlikely victory. Observers were stunned not simply because the incumbent lost, but because the system itself appeared so tightly controlled.
Even in Nigeria, there is a parallel worth noting. The 2015 election marked the first time an incumbent government was defeated at the federal level. After 16 years in power, the People’s Democratic Party lost to the opposition All Progressives Congress, with Muhammadu Buhari defeating sitting president Goodluck Jonathan. Nigeria’s system was not as tightly controlled as some of the others, but incumbency advantages were significant, and the peaceful transfer of power remains one of the most important democratic milestones on the continent.
What ties these cases together is not geography or ideology, but structure. In each instance, the incumbents were not merely competing in elections. They were operating within systems they had helped shape to their advantage. That is what makes their defeat so consequential.
These elections also reveal a set of recurring conditions. Opposition unity emerges as a decisive factor. Fragmented challengers rarely succeed against entrenched power. Where victories occur, coalitions are often broad and strategic. There is also the question of scale. Narrow wins can be contested or overturned. Landslides, like in Zambia, are harder to dispute. And finally, institutions matter. Even in weakened democracies, electoral bodies, courts or regional actors can become the final line between transition and crisis.
The contrast with countries like Russia under Vladimir Putin or Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is instructive. In such systems, the combination of institutional control and political strategy has so far proven resilient against electoral defeat. Which is precisely why the few exceptions stand out so sharply.
Obama’s words, then, were not just about Hungary or Poland. They were about a fragile but enduring truth. Even in systems designed to resist change, the possibility of change still exists.
It is rare. It is difficult. But as these moments show, it is not impossible.
